Focus and the Licensing of Negative Polarity Items by Pye, Clifton & Pao, Yin-Yin
FOCUS AND THE LICENSING OF NEGATIVE POLARITY ITEMS 
Eugene G. Rohrbaugh II 
The University of Texas at Austin 
1 . What is a Negative Polarity Item? 
This paper deals with the distribution and interpretation of negative polarity items (NPis). 
An NPI is an expression that occurs naturally in negated contexts, but not in corresponding non-
negated contexts. 
(1) a. John didn't lift a.finger to help Lucy move. 
b. Mary doesn't have any idea how to sew a costume. 
c. Phil hasn't ever been to Yemen. 
d. Bart didn't earn one thin dime selling Christmas cards. 
(2) a. *John lifted a.finger to help Lucy move. 
b. *Mary has any idea how to sew a costume. 
c. *Phil has ever been to Yemen. 
d. *Bart earned one thin dime selling Christmas cards. 
The licensing contexts for NPis are broader than strict syntactic negation. 
(3) a. John regrets that he lifted a finger to help Lucy move. 
b. Few people have any idea how to sew a costume. 
c. Has Phil ever been to Yemen? 
d. Bart hardly earned one thin dime selling Christmas cards. 
Krifka (l 991) lists the following licensers for NPis: 
• certain quantified NPs (such as/ew people) 
• certain determiners (such as every) 
• certain modal operators (such as hardly) 
• the protasis of conditional sentences 
• adversative predicates (such as regret) 
• the standard clause of comparative and excessive constructions 
• grading particles (such as only) 
• certain temporal conjunctions (such as long after) 
• generic sentences (e.g. Any tourist who visits Yemen enjoys the country.) 
• questions (e.g. Do you know any professors from Pennsylvania?) 
• offers (e.g. You can help yourself to any food in the refrigerator.) 
• commands (e.g. Pick up any /rash you see in the yard.) . 
In section 2 of this paper, I will present an overview of the current account for the licensing 
and interpretation of NPls. In section 3, I will indicate some problems for the current theory, and 
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2. NPI Theories: Downward-entalllngness and Scalar lmpllcature 
The basic account ofNPls, following Fauconnier {1975) and Ladusaw (1979), relies on 
the notions of downward-entailingness, scalar irnplicature, and infonnativity. In sections 
2.1.-2.3. I will describe three basic assumptions which taken together can explain the occurrence 
and interpretation ofNPis in some contexts. 
2. 1. Scalar lmpllcature 
The first assumption is that the common knowledge shared by native speakers of a 
language includes various scales which speakers can use to reason deductively. Some possible 










NPis are represented as minimal elements of such scales. It is not necessary that speakers agree on 
the entire structure of such a scale, it is sufficient that they agree on the question of which NPls 
belong to which scales. For example, it is not necessacy that all speakers agree on the relative 
ranking of different elements of the scale of Effort Expended, as long as they agree that 'lift a 
finger' is the minimal element of that particular scale. 
• 5 apples 
4 apples 
• 3 apples 
• any apples 
Quantities of Apples 
lift a finger 
Effort Expended 
Figure2 
• a gallon 
• a quart 
• acup 
• a drop 
Quantities of Liquid 
Furthennore, it is not necessary that the scales be linear, nor that they refer to quantities, although 
the ones 1' ve represented here are. The following scale represents a taxonomy of types of apples. 
red granny 




Now, several observations can be made about such scales. In a 'nonnal' context f, for all 
y < x on some scale. if F(x) is true. then F(y) is true. So, for example, the truth of ( 4) guarantees 
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the truth of (5) below. In addition, an assertion F(x) is stronger (more infonnative) than an 
assertion F(y) for all x>y. So in a context where both (4) and (5) are true, a speaker makes a 
stronger assertion by uttering (4). 
( 4) John ate four apples. 
(5) John ate three apples. 
The same relationships hold between (6) and (7). When (6) is true, (7) must be true, and (6) is 
the more specific (stronger) assertion of the two. 
(6) John ate a granny smilh apple. 
(7) John ate a green apple. 
Now, if z is an NPI, and ifNPls are indeed minimal scalar elements, then F(z) will be the 
least informative assertion based on F. 
2.2. Downward·Entalllngness 
The following is a definition of downward~ntailing contexts based on Krifka (1991). 
A tennis in a DE context in an assertion sentence if and only if it can be 
replaced by a semantically stronger (i.e. more restricted) expression without 
changing the truth of the sentence. 
In (8) and (9) we see that the tenn never introduces a DE context. 
(8) John has never eaten ice cream. 
(9) John has never eaten strawberry ice cream. 
1bis is so since, when we replace the tenn ice cream with the more restricted strawberry 
ice cream the truth of the sentence is unchanged, since the truth of (8) guarantees the truth of (9). 
In a downward-entailing (DE) context, scales are in effect reversed. This can be formalized 
as follows: 
In 'normal' contexts: F(x) & y<x => F(y) 
(n DE contexts: F(x) & y>x => F(y) 
(10) John didn't eat lhree apples. 
(11) =>John didn't eat/our apples (Jive apples, six apples, ... ). 
So ifz is an NPI, and Fis DE, F(z) is the most informative assertion based on F. 
2.3. lnformatlvtty 
Given the above notions of DEness and Scalar lmplicature, if we add a Gricean maxim 
requiring informative utterances, we can correctly predict the occurrence of NPis in DE contexts 
making strong assertions, and the nonoccurrence ofNPls in non-DE contexts. So for example the 
NPI anyone in (12) is licensed since it occurs in a DE context (embedded under the negation in 
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didn't); furthennore (12) makes a very strong (i.e. infonnative) claim: the hearer can substitute any 
more specific value for anyone and correctly conclude that the proposition would remain true (e.g. 
I didn't see anyone =>I didn't see Mr. Smith). In contrast, anyone is not licensed in (13), as the 
context is non-DE, and consequently the claim made is too weak to pass the Gricean standard of 
infonnativity. 
(12) I didn't see anyone downtown today. 
(13) *I saw anyone downtown today. 
2.4. Conclusion 
The occurrence ofNPls in some contexts can be explained based on the notions ofDEness, 
scalar implicature, and infonnativity. In what follows I will refer to this account as the DE/SI 
account. 
3. Problems for current Theories 
In this section I will point out two shortcomings of the DE/SI account ofNPI licensing. 
The first is a predictive failure, an environment where NPis do in fact occur, but where DE/SI fails 
to predict that they could. The second is not a predictive failure, but rather a failure to capture a 
generalization about the behavior of a certain type of NPI, namely those fanned with the quantifier 
any. These two shortcomings will indicate that the DE/SI account must at least be modified to 
account for natural language use ofNPls. 
3.1 NPls in non-truth-conditional utterances 
The occurrence ofNPis in questions, as in (J 4), poses a problem for the DE/SI account of 
NPI licensing. 
( 14) Has John eaten any ice cream ? 
DEness is defined in terms of truth conditions, which reflect the meaning of declarative utterances. 
But the meaning of interrogative utterances is modeled in terms of answerhood conditians. The 
substitution from (1 S) to ( 16) of strawberry ice cream for ice cream is parallel to that in (6) and (7) 
above. But we cannot apply the same test for DEness that we applied to (6) and (7). (i.e. "If (IS) 
is true, can we say that (16) is necessarily true?'') 
{15) Has John eaten ice cream ? 
( 16) Has John eaten strawberry ice cream ? 
An obvious solution to this problem would be to modify the notion of DEness to make it 
well-defined for interrogatives as well as declaratives. The following is an initial attempt 
A term is in a DE context in an assertion/interrogative sentence if and only if it can be 
replaced by a semantically stronger (i.e. more restricted) expression while presaving the 
truth/answerhood conditions of the _whole expression. 
Take U(X) to mean an utterance U with some subexpression X. and y(X) to mean X restricted by 
a modifier y. The test for DEness is now the following: 
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a. If the meaning ofU is modeled by truth conditions, 
then X is in a DE environment in U 
iffTRUE(U{X)] ~ TRUE[U(y(X))]. 
b. If the meaning ofU is modeled by answerhood conditions, 
then X is in a DE environment in U 
iff any answer to U(X) is also an answer to U(y(X)). 
Now let us apply this test to the environment in (15). In this case, 
· U(X) Has John eaten ice cream ? 
y(X) = strawberry ice cream 
U(y(X)) = Has John eaten strawberry ice cream ? 
Rohrbaugh 
We fmd that the environment in (15) does JlQ1 count as DE, as an answer to (15) does not 
necessarily resolve the question in (16) (It does so only in the negative case). So even with this 
extended notion ofDEness, we find that the DE/SI account does not correctly predict the 
occurrence ofNPis in questions. 
3. 2 Polarity-Sensitive any and Free-Choice any 
One way that NP Is are formed in English is through the use of the quantifier any . 
. Expressions of the fonn any CN, where CN is a common noun, can occur m all of NPI 
environments listed in section 1 above. It has been obseived that there seem to be two semantically 
different any's: polarity-sensitive any (PS any) and free-choice any (FC any). PS any is usually 
associated with an existential reading, whereas FC any is usually assigned a universal reading. 
This can be seen in the sentences in ( 17), whose meanings are roughly represented in ( 18). 
(17) a. I didn't see any apples. 
b. I would dance with any woman. 
(18) a. -, 3 x [ apple(x) & I saw x 1 
b. ';/ x [ woman(x)--+ I would dance with x] 
(PS any) 
(FCany) 
The following are observations about FC any are made by Carlson (1981) and Kadmon 
and Landman (1993). 
• FC any requires stress 
• FC any is licensed in a wide variety of contexts 
• FC any can be modified by almost, whereas PS any cannot. 
• any in some contexts is ambiguous between PS and FC any 
• any exhibits the same range of quantificational force as a/an (i.e. universal and existential 
readings) 
• any functions to 'widen' the meaning of a common noun. 
4. Solution: Focus as a supplementary licenser of NPJs 
In this section I will offer two kinds of evidence to support a connection between NPI 
licensing and Focus. In 4.1. I will show that NPls are not licensed in questions without also being 
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focused. In 4.2. I will show that, contrary to the claims ofKadmon and Landman (1993), any is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to induce widening. Finally, in 4.3. I will show that the unique 
characteristics ofFC any, including widening, can be explained as consequences of being under 
focus. 
4.1 Focus ls necessary for the felicitous use of any In questions 
Rochemont ( l 986) points out that nonnal question/answer pairs share the same focus. 
(19) a. [Who ]F came to the party? 
b. [John ]F came to the party. 
c. •John came to the [party ]F 
Despite the fact that wh-words (such as who in (l 9.a)) are not nonnally stressed in English, they 
are usually considered to be focused. Theoretical support for this comes from the fact that 
questions introduce background/focus structures, with the background fanned by the sentence 
with an open variable at the position of the wh-word. Empirical support comes from languages 
which have a focus position, such as Basque or Hungarian. Jn such languages wh-words are 
moved into the focus position. The fact that wb-words are not normally stressed in English may 
be due to their pronominal nature. 
In (20) we see that natural responses may select alternatives to the focused element in a yes/no 
question. 
(20) a. Did John help you move? 
b. Did John help you [MOVE]p? 
c. Did John help [YOU]F move? 
d. Did John (HELP]F you move? 
e. Did John [HELP YOU MOVE]p? 
f. Did [JOHNJF help you move? 
Yes/No. 
No, he helped me [ PACK ]F 
No, he helped [ MARY ]F move. 
No, he [ WATCHED ]F me move. 
No, he [ WENT TO THE MALL ]F 
No, [ PHIL ]F did. 
In addition, notice that any of the responses in b-f are natural responses to the question in a, which 
does not have focus on any element This is so because the hearer can naturally reinterpret a as one 
of the other questions in (20). 
In (21), although Ji.fl a finger may be unstressed, it nevertheless must be in focus, as resi>onses 
which select alternatives to lift afmger are natural, whereas those which select alternatives to other 
sentential elements are not 
(21) a. Did John lift a finger to help you? 
b. Well no, he didn't 
c. Yes; as a matter of fact he [ carried boxes for over 2 hours ]F 
d. *No, [PHIL]F did. 
e. *No, he did it to help [MARY]F 
In this case the hearer cannot reinterpret the question with focus on some element other than Ii.fl a 
finger, and consequently the responses in (d) and (e) are unnatural. 
In the following questions, anyone is focused, as answers referring to elements other than 
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anyone are unnatural.I 
(22) a. Did John mail packages to anyone? 
b. Yes, to [BILL, TED, AND MARY ]F. 
c. ?No, he ( SHIPPED ]F them. 
d. ?No, [ PHIL ]F did. 
(23) a. Did anyone help you? 
b. Yes, BILL (did). 
c. ?No, someone helped Mary. 
Pragmatically, NPls of the form any CNhave a similar function in questions as to wh-
words: they mark elements about which the questioner wants more information. The response in 
(24.c) would be deemed at best uncooperative. 
(24) a. Did you do anything this morning? [VP do anything]F 
b. I went to the store. 
c. ?Yes. 
4.2. Focus, any, and widening 
Kadmon and Landman claim that the semantic function of any is to widen the denotation of 
a common noun along some contextually specified parameter. 
(B) WIDENING In an NP of the fonn any CN. any widens the interpretation of the common 
noun phrase (CN) along a contextual dimension. 
In the following example based on Kadmon and Landman. speaker A is conversiOg with 
speaker B, a cook for a group of50 people. 
(25) A:. Will there be French fries tonight? 
B: No, J don't have potatoes. 
A:. Don't you have even a couple of potatoes that I could take and fry in my room? 
B: Sony, I don't have ANY potatoes. 
According to Kadmon and Landman, in B's first utterance, 'potatoes' refers only to large 
quantities of potatoes (large enough to make French fries for the whole group). In B's second 
utterance, B 'widens' the meaning of 'potatoes' to include even small quantities of potatoes. 
4.2.1. Any is not sufficient to Induce widening 
Unstressed any can occur in an NP without inducing widening. 
t The responses given are possible responses to the question, but they seem more like corrections 
than answers. They wo~d be expected in a discourse such as the following: 
i. a: Did John mail packages to anyone? 
b: No, (you have it wrong), he SHIPPED them. 
a: Yes, well anyway, who did he ship them to? 
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(26) k. Will there be French fries tonight? 
B: No, I don't have any potatoes. 
k. Don't you have even a couple of potatoes that I could take and fry in my room? 
B: Well sure, there's one or two back in the pantry; you can help yourself. 
231 
In appropriate conversational contexts B's initial response could mean either that B doesn't have 
enough potatoes (as in (26)) or that B has no potatoes (as in (27)). 
(27) A: Will there be French fries tonight? 
B: No, I don't have any potatoes. 
A: Don't you have even a couple of potatoes that 1 could take and fiy in my room? 
B: Sony, I don't have ANY potatoes. 
The data in (27) suggest that it is not the term any, in and of itself, but rather stress on any 
which induces widening. 
4.2.2. Any Is not necessary to induce widening 
Above I've demonstrated that occurrence of any is not a sufficient condition for widening. 
Now I will attempt to show that any is also not a necessary condition for widening. The following 
examples show that the widening induced by any can be indicated in other ways. 
(28) 
(29) 
k. Will there be French fries tonight? 
B: No, I don't have potatoes. 
A: Don't you have even a couple of potatoes that I could take and fry in my room? 
B: NO, I DON'T HA VE POTATOES! 
k. Will there be French fries tonight? 
B: No, I don't have any potatoes. 
k. Don't you have even a couple of potatoes that I could take and fry in my room? 
B: Sorry, I don't have any potatoes AT ALL. 
The following example, based on Kadmon and Landman's (39), shows widening from a 
qualified tenn (dry match) to an unqualified tenn (match). 
(30) a. If you take a dJ:y match and strike it, it lights. 
b. Ifl take ANY match and strike it, it lights! 
I assume a fonn of specificity lattice similar to the polarity lattices of Krifka (1991 ). Tenns at 
higher nodes are more specific, those at lower nodes are less specific. The tenn ANY match in 




Specificity Lattice for the Tenn any match 
Example (31) shows the same type of widening without the occurrence of any. 
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(31) a. If you take a dry match and strike it, it lights. 
b. lfl take a WET match and strike it, it lights! 
In this case the widening is introduced by the stress on the adjective wet. In the context of the 
discourse, (31.b) gets the same interpretation as (30.b). This widening seems to be triggered by 
(i) conversational principles and (ii) the structure of the polarity lattices introduced by tenns such as 
drv match (generally, terms built with complement adjectives.) Nonnal conversational principles 
aliow (or cause) unchallenged assertions to be added to the common ground. So (31.a) is added to 
the common ground, since it is not denied. Now, the term dry match introduces a (contextually 




Specificity Lattice for any ma/Ch 
with a binary split for wet/dry. 
Now there are two different ways to exhaust the lattice in Figure 7. The first is to make an 
assertion by referring to the minimal element, as in (32). The second is to make two separate 
assertions referring to the two nodes immediately above the minimal element, as in (33). 
(32) 
(33) 
Ifl take any match .. . 
a. I fl take a dry match .. . 
b. Ifl take a wet match .. . 
In (31), the speak.erof(a) makes a statement which goes unchallenged and so it is allowed 
to stand. Then the speaker of (b) makes an additional assertion. These two statements together 
exhaust the polarity lattice, with the same result as if(30.b) had been uttered. 
These situations seem semantically similar to the 'unconditionals' discussed by Zaefferer 
(1991). 
(34) a. Whether you like it or not, I won't pennit smoking here. 
b. Ready or not, here I come! 
The protases of these conditionals could logically be rephrased as "in any case" or "in any event". 
They are similar in that by referring to two complementarily exhaustive elements, the speaker 
achieves the same result as by ref erring to the minimal element 
you're -><.~•l'r~ oot ready 
in any case 
(concerning your being ready) 
Figure6 
Lattice Structure for Unconditional 
"Ready or not, ..• " 
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4.2.3. The role of Focus 
We saw in 4.2 that the behavior of unstressed any was different from that of stressed any. 
What is the role of stress in the assignment of widening readings? Kadmon and Landman claim 
that "any cannot be truly dissociated from its widening feature" and that "emphatic or major stress 
is neither sufficient nor necessary for the widening observed with any". In section l l showed that 
any can in fact be dissociated from widening. In this section I will discuss Kadrnon and 
Landman's evidence against associating widening with stress and conclude that widening is the 
result of the interaction between focus and the polarity lattice introduced by a term any CN. 
One of Kadmon and Landman's main points is that " ... while stressed an1 seems to always 
indicate widening, stress on every is sometimes entirely unable to express anything like widening." · 
As evidence they give the following two examples (their 41-42). 
(35) Every match I strike lights. -Not ANY match, of course, a wet one doesn't. 
(36) #Every match I strike lights-Not EVERY match, of course, a wet one doesn't. 
My first observation here is that (35) can be quite natural discourse in English, provided the correct 
intonation pattern on every. Nevertheless, I think that both of these sentences exhibit something 




An owl hunts mice. Not ANY owl, of course-sick ones don't-but still, an owl hunts 
mice. 
An owl hunts mice. Not EVERY owl, of course-sick ones don't-but still, an owl hunts 
mice. 
In both of these, the speaker simply clarifies his meaning (forcing the intended interpretation on the 
hearer) and this is precisely what we have called widening. It is clear that the speaker does not 
change his meaning, as be repeats the initial assertion at the end. Both utterances of the assertion 
must be interpreted according to the clarification. In contrast, (35) and (36) do not exhibit 
widening, in that the speaker does not clarify, but rather corrects his statement, making a different 
assertion in the end. This is not to say that the two sentences must have the same meaning; (36) 
does seem to sound more like a correction than (35). But this difference cannot be attnouted to 
widening. In an extended context both of them must be taken as corrections. In effect, the speaker 
retracts something of the force of his initial statement, leaving a different assertion. This is verified 
in the following extended discourses. 
(35 ') Every match I strike lights. -Not ANY match, of course, a wet one doesn't. •But still, 
every match I strike lights. 
(36') Every match I strike lights-Not EVERY match, of course, a wet one doesn't. •But still, 
every match I strike lights. 
It seems that the unavailability of widening in (35) and (36) is due to the use of every to 
introduce the CN match. This prohibits any real widening, whereas in (37) and (38) widening is 
available, since the CN owl is introduced by the term an owl. 
In this section I have shown that widening cannot be formulated apart from stress, as it is 
stress on any that induces widening. 
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4.3. Focus explains unique characteristics of Free-choice any 
• FC any requires stress because it is nothing more than an instance of any licensed by focus. 
Consider the following example. 
(39) I would pet ANY kitten. 
By uttering this, the speaker contrasts this proposition with alternative propositions using other 





Lattice Structure for the tenn any kitten 
So the speaker of (39) makes the most general assertion, contrasting it with all more specific 
assertions of the fonn I would pet X. where Xis some alternative tenn on the lattice. 
• FC any is licensed in a wide variety of contexts since it is restricted not by syntactic position, but 
by ability to be focused. 
• Modifiers of FC any, such as almost, are licensed as focus-sensitive operators. Focus-sensitive 
operators, such as even, require that there be some focused element in their scope. 
(40) a. I would dance with almost ANY woman. 
b. Almost ANY lawyer could tell you that. 
c. I don't have (*almost) any potatoes. 
d. I regret that I gave you (*almost) any money to begin with. 
Relatively free word order suggests that almost nnd even are sentence level operators which 
associate with a focused element. 
( 41) a. Phil would dance with ANY woman, almost. 
b. Phil would almost dance with ANY woman. 
c Phil almost would dance with ANY woman. 
d. Phil would even dance with a TALL woman. 
e. Phil would dance with even a TALL woman. 
f. Phil would dance with a TALL woman, even. 
g. *Phil would dance with a TALL woman, very. 
• The FC/PS ambiguity arises since any within an affective context can also be focused. 
Those instances where any is licensed by focus are also the instances where almost can occur. In 
cases where any can be dually-licensed (e.g. by an affective context mid by focus), the use of 
almost improves with heavy stress (perhaps indicating focus as the 'primary' licenser). 
(39) a. I didn't get almost ANY of the Cap'n Crunch, and now it's gone! 
b. I hate that supermarket-they didn't charge me right for almost ANY thing! 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper I have shown how DE/SI accounts for NPis in some contexts, (e.g. negation, 
quantified NPs, etc.), and that focus plays a role in the licensing of NPls (most notably NP Is of 
the form any CN) in non-DE contexts, such as questions. The use of any CN makes salient a 
lattice-like structure associated with CN, and the tenn any CN refers to the minimal element. Such 
an analysis provides an explanation for the occurrence ofNPis in questions. In addition, it 
explains the following observations about the distinction between FC any and PS any. 
• PS any is licensed by DE/SI, whereas FC any is licensed by Focus. 
• FC any requires stress because it is nothing more than an instance of any licensed by Focus. 
• FC any is licensed in a wide variety of contexts since it is restricted not by syntactic position. but 
by ability to be focused. 
• The FC/PS ambiguity arises since any within an affective context can also be focused. 
• Modifiers ofFC any, such as almost, are licensed as focus-sensitive operators. 
• The widening function of any is related to contrastive focus: the speaker implicitly contrasts any 
CN with a more restricted tenn based on CN, fanning maximally informative utterances in DE 
contexts. 
These observations remain to be formally placed within a more comprehensive theory of 
questions, such as those of Groenendijk and Stokhof ( 1984, 1990), Bennan ( 1991 ), Lahiri ( 1991) 
or Ginzburg (1992). The following are other remaining research questions: 
• Why do NPis not occur in other presumed focus environments in English? 
(42) a. "'It's ANYONE that I want to see. 
• Why do questions with idiomatic NPis favor negatively-biased rhetorical readings, whereas 
NP Is of the form any CN are natural for infonnation questions? 
• How does the interpretation of NP I-term questions differ from that of wh-term questions? 
How are they the same? 
• How are NPis licensed in other non-truth-conditional utterance types, such as commands and 
offers? 
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